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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-INSOLVENcY-TRACING

TRUST

FUNDS

WHERE

CHaECK Is GIVEN FOR SPECIAL PuRlosE-Plaintiff deposited two checks, with
the proceeds of which a bank was to purchase bonds. The bank, however, created a savings account, in which plaintiff was credited, and forwarded the checks
for credit to correspondent banks. At the time of the bank's insolvency, these
credit accounts had been exhausted. The lowest intermediate balance in 'the
bank was at all times in excess of the amount of the checks. Plaintiff asserted
a trust, traceable into this latter fund, in the hands of the defendant receiver.
Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to a preference. Schumacher v. Harriett, 52
F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 4 th, 193).
An exception to the rule that when money is deposited in a bank a debtorcreditor relationship ensues, appears when the money is to be used for a specifically designated purpose, in which case a trust has been held to result., It would2
appear that, under this exception, a trust exists in these checks or their proceeds.
The further question remains, has the plaintiff succeeded in tracing the trust
property into the hands of the receiver? It is well established that no change
of form can divest trust property of its true character so long as it remains capable of clear identification.3 Where a trustee has commingled trust property, the
degree of identification required by the great majority of courts is that the
cestui que trust must trace the trust res into some particular asset in the hands
of the bank.' A number of jurisdictions at one time required proof only that
the trust property was mingled with the general assets,' but these states are now
largely in accord with the majority view.0 If a trustee has commingled trust
moneys with his own in one bank account, it is presumed that his withdrawals
for other than trust purposes were from his own money,' but the cestid is permitted a preference only to the extent of the lowest intermediate balance.8 But
in the instant case the res of. the trust, the checks, may be traced directly into
the hands of the correspondent banks, where the proceeds were substituted therefor, and consequently the court should not have presumed, that the bank re2 Dugan v. Security Say. Bank, 205 Iowa 171, 217 N. W. 831 (1928) (to pay premium
on surety bond) ; Greenfield v. Clarence Say. Bank, .5 S. W. (2d) 708 (Mo. App. 1928) (to
buy bonds); Evans v. French, 222 Mo. App. 99o, 6 S. W. (2d) 655 (1928) (to buy government bonds) ; cf. Schumacher v. Brinson, 52 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) (general deposit converted into a special deposit).
2 Ibid.
'Oliver v. Piatt, 44 U. S. 333 (1845) ; Macy v. Roedenbeck, 227 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th,
1915) ; Farmers etc. Nat. Bank v. King, 57 Pa. 202 (1868).
'Little v. Chadwick, 151 Mass. lO9, 23 N. E. 1005 (1889) ; Central Nat. Bank v. First
Nat. Bank, 117 Neb. 161, 219 N. W. 894 (1928); BOGERT, TRUSTS (1921) 528.
'McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. 173 (1886).
0
Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, 8' Wis. 237, 58 N. W. 383 (1894) ; State v. Bank of
Commerce, 54 Neb. 725, 75 N. W. 28 (1898). For a complete citation of cases, see L. R. A.
I916C 21. This "increased assets theory" fails to recognize that specific property is required
as the res of a trust. As a creditor the cestui is not entitled to a preference over other creditors. It is his only as a property owner. BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 533.
7 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Elliotte, :28 Fed. 567 (1914); In re Hallett's Est., 13 Ch.
D. 6g6 (1879) ; It re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch. 356.
"The presumption is rebutted when the account falls below the amount of the trust and
to this extent must be regarded as dissipated. Subsequent additions of other than trust money
cannot be impressed with a trust. Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U. S. 707, 34 Sup. Ct. 466
(1914); Board of Comm'rs of Crawford County v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 6th,
19o7) ; Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356, 91 N. E. 332 (191o).
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spected the trust, treated the checks as its own, and substituted an equivalent
amount of cash in its vaults which became the res of the trust.9 If the checks
are traced into the correspondent banks, no preference should be allowed, for
that money cannot be traced into the assets in the hands of the receiver.' 0 Although a court of equity will go far in following trust money, when in fact
the money cannot be traced, the equitable right of the cestui fails.'1 It would
seem that this decision would result in a recrudescence of the discredited doctTine which permitted a preference merely on proof that the assets had been
increased by the trust property.
BILLS AND NorEs-N. I. L. § I4-DEATH AS AFFECTING LIABILITY OF
ESTATE OF MAKER OF BLANK INSTRUMEN\T-Decedent and his wife had kept

their funds in a common account, which was in decedent's name. In settlement
of her share, decedent gave her a note, signed in blank, and directed her to fill
it up for the proper amount. She did not fill up the blanks until after the death
of the decedent. Held, that the wife could recover on the instrument, since her
authority to complete the note was coupled with an interest and hence was not
revoked by the death of the maker. In re Ferraraet al., 156 Atl. 265 (N. J.
1931).

The court in the instant case was confronted with two possibilities; does
the Negotiable Instruments Act permit the execution of the agency under these
circumstances; and, if it does not, is there present apart from the Act, an
irrevocable authority on principles of common law agency. The court was manifestly correct in concluding that the authority granted by section fourteen' of
the Act to fill up incomplete instruments within a reasonable time, fails to
provide for the contingency of the death of the person to be bound upon the
instrument before the exercise of such authority. Such silence on the part of
Cotting v. Berry, 5o Colo. 217, 114 Pac. 641 (1911) ; BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at
531. Under this, its first argument, the court reasoned that the bank was presumed to withdraw its own money first, leaving the trust money intact, thus allowing plaintiff to trace directly into the funds in the hands of the receiver.
The court glibly brushes aside all difficulties by saying at p. 820: "There is no more
reason, in such case, for refusing to declare a trust on the ,funds remaining than there would
be to refuse to do so because the bank had paid out the identical currency which the cestui
que trust had placed in its possession." But it would seem the cestui should lose all rights
to be preferred in such case. His rights to a preference over general creditors is based on
his claiming his own property and this should be defeated by proof of its dissipation. Neely
v. Rood, 54 Mich. 134, i N. W. 92o (1884) ; Italian Fruit & Importing Co. v. Penniman, iOO

Md. 698, 6I Atl. (19o5) ; Clinton Min. & Mineral Co. v. Trust Co. of N. A., 35 S. D.
253, 151 N. W. 998 (915).
Contra: Blythe v. Kujawa, 175 Minn. 88, 22o N. W. 168 (1928)
(adversely criticized in Note (1928) 13 MINN. L. REV. 38, 46).

" Macy v. Roedenbeck, supra note 3; Leach v. City-Commercial Say. Bank, 207 Iowa
1254, 219 N. W. 496 (1928) ; Neely v. Rood; Italian Fruit and Importing Co. v. Penniman;

Clinton Min.& Mineral Co. v. Trust Co. of N. A., all supra note 9; Note (1928)
L. REV. 38, 44.

13 MINN.

This would seem to rebut the second argument of the court, which at p. 82o, said: "These
credits in correspondent banks, together with the cash and cash items in the vaults of the
banks, constitute its immediately available assets. . . . All were equally under the control
of the bank; and if one was exhausted, there is every reason for holding that the others were
subjected to the trust, on the principle of comingling of trust funds, that there is ;for holding
that the remaining currency is subject to the trust, although the identical currency which the
cestui que trust deposited may have been paid out." A preference was then permitted on the
theory that the trustee was presumed to respect the trust in his withdrawals.
Little v. Chadwick, supra note 4.
'"In order, however, that any such instrument when completed may be enforced against
any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in
accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time."
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the statute causes the common law to be applicable.2 Applying the familiar
rules of agency,- the authority to complete the instrument was revoked by operation of law upon the death of the maker.4 The few cases which have dealt
with this point prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Act are in
agreement.5 An often-mentioned exception to the general principle that death
revokes an agency is the so-called "power coupled with an interest". 6 In the
leading case of Hunt v. Rousmanier a distinction is drawn between powers
irrevocable only inter vivos and those which are irrevocable even after the death
of the principal. In that case Chief Justice Marshall stated a "power coupled
with an interest" to be the only agency which survives the death of the principal
and defined such a power as one which accompanies a legal estate or title in a
thing real or personal over which the power is to be exercised." Where the
power granted to the agent is not identified with any title or interest in the thing
constituting the subject-matter of the agency, the relationship will not survive
the death of the principal, although he cannot by his voluntary act in his lifetime
terminate it.0 This distinction has been almost unanimously adopted by American courts,10 but has not escaped well-merited criticism.:" At times, courts purri,2 .s.
where the negotiable instruments act speaks, it controls; where it is silent, resort must be had to the law merchant or the common law regulating commercial paper."
Mechanics' and Farmers' Say. Bank v. Katterjohn, 137 Ky. 427, 432, 125 S. W. 1071, 1073

(igio).

The same view was adopted in a somewhat analogous situation involving a Motors Vehicles Statute. By the Act of May 14, 1929, P. L. 1721, the operation of a motor vehicle by
a non-resident within the State of Pennsylvania constitutes an appointment of the Secretary
of Revenue as the agent of the non-resident for service of process in civil suits for damages
caused by such operation. In Arlotta et al. v. McCauley, Admx., 79 Pitts. L. J. 132 (Pa.
1931), the non-resident died before service on the Secretary of Revenue and the court held
that the agency had ceased upon the death of the principal.
The Negotiable Instruments Act may, qf course, change the common law principles of
agency. It has done so in section 20, with reference to the doctrine of undisclosed principal.
3 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d. ed. 1914) § 652, TIFFANY, LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(1903) 144; AGENCY RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1927) § 200.
"Contra: Brown v. Thomas, 12o Va. 763, 92 S. E. 977 (1917). The court in this case
took the position that the statute provided for the termination of the authority by a single
means only-the effusion of time. Withdrawal of authority, death of the principal and the
other usual methods by Which authority is rescinded is to be held as completely abrogated by
a most literial interpretation of the words "within a reasonable time."
On the other hand it has been stated that the Negotiable Instruments Law is "necessarily
a partial codification", and cannot possibly include all branches of the law which necesssarily
will be involved in bills and notes cases. Beutel, The Negotiable Instruients Act Should
Not Be Anmded (1932) 8o U. op PA. L. REv. 368, 372. See also MAXWEML, ON TER INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (7th ed. 1929) 71; BLAcK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
OF TE LAWS (2d ed. 1911) § io6.
r

".

. . no one will question but what his death, per se, operated to revoke the author-

ity to fill the blanks and to subsequently put the paper in circulation." Michigan Ins. Co. v.
Leavenworth, 30 Vt 11, 22 (856); Canal and Clarborne R. R. v. Succession of John Armstrong, 27 La. Ann. 433, 435 (1875); Hatch v. Searles, 2 Sm. & Giff. 147, 154 (Eng. 1854).
0I MEcHEm, op. cit. supra note 3, § 570 et seq.; TiFFA-Y, op. cit. supra note 3, 152 et

seq.

S 8 Wheat. i74 (U. S. 1823).
Ibid. at 201 et seq.
' The normal power of attorney ceases whenever the creator wills. Powers given for a
consideration or as security may not be revoked by the creator, but since the acts must be
performed in the name of the principal, his death will prevent the exercise of such acts;
hence the requirement that the grantee of the power hold a legal title or interest in res. But,
if one has a legal title, there would seem to be no need for the power.
'Roland v. Coleman & Co., 76 Ga. 652 (886) ; Citizens State Bank v. Tessman, 121
Minn. 34, 14o N. W. 178 (913) ; AGENCY RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1927) § 235.
In England there is no difference in the actual results, although the two types of powers
are designated by the one name. See Watson v. King, 4 Camp. 272 (Eng. 1815).
' "The whole reasoning of the court, in Hunt v. Rousmanier, shows their anxiety to rid

themselves of the absurdity into which a strict adherence to the principle that death is a
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porting to follow the leading case, have avoided its unjust consequences by defining the word "interest" in-such a manner as to cover the case in issue, thus effacing the distinction between revocation inter vivos and revocation by death of the
principal. 12 In the instant case the court was driven to some such latitude of
construction 13 and although there is no overwhelming social desirability in permitting the filling in of instruments after the death of the party bound thereon,
there is no greater chance of fraud in such a situation than if the claimant were
to prove the obligation by other means.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION OF COURT OF DOmICILE TO ADJUDICATE
OF A PERSON RESIDING ABROAD--Petitioner sued in Illinois for a decree to declare defendant insane and to appoint a guardian of his person. The
alleged incompetent was domiciled in Illinois but resided in California where a
copy of the newspaper notice of the suit was sent to him by mail. Held, that
the petition be denied for want of jurisdiction over the defendant's person.1
McCormick v. Blaine, 178 N. E. 195 (Ill. 1931).
Matters concerning a status are generally determinable only by the law of the
individual's domicile 2 since it is the state of domicile which is most concerned
*with his more or less permanent relations with other members of society.3 There
is little doubt that the purpose of the action in the principal case was to fix the
defendant's status 4 since an adjudication of insanity and the appointment of a
guardian of the person seriously impair the incompetent's liberty 5 and other more
or less permanent rights." Thus the holding of the court that it has no jurisdiction
to determine the defendant's status merely because he is residing abroad is not
only theoretically incorrect but has the unfortunate practical effect of preventing
the appointment of a permanent guardian as long as the defendant remains in another state.7 However, the decision in the instant case may be justified on the
INSANITY

revocation of a power, would lead them." Cassiday v. M'Kenzie, 4 W. & S. 282, 285 (Pa.
1842) ; Seavey, Termination by Death of ProprietaryPowers of Attorney (1922) 31 YALF.
L. J. 283; HUFFCUT, AGENCY (2d ed. IpoI) 89.
' Stevens v. Sessa, 5o App. Div. 547, 64 N. Y. Supp. 28 (r9oo) ; Mulloney v. Black, 244
Mass. 391, 138 N. E. 584 (1923).
1 While it is true the donee of the power had possession of the incomplete instrument
and to that extent satisfied the requirement of holding title to a res, yet obviously it was only
by virtue of the exercise of the power that a chose-in-action which would have value could
come into existence.
'The opinion is based on a confused distinction between actions in personain and decrees
in ren. The court maintains that the decree appointing a guardian, admittedly in rem, must
be preceded by an action to determine the defendant's insanity which, they say, is an action
in personam.
'Duryea v. Duryea, 46 Idaho 512, 269 Pac. 987 (1928) ; McDowell v. Gould, 166 Ga.
670, 144 S. E. 2o6 (I928), annotated in (1928) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 338; cf. McMullin v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 261 Pa. 574, lO4 At. 760 (1918) ; 2 FREEIMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed.
1925) § 902.

'Goodrich, Custody of Childrenjin Divorce Suits (1921) 7 CORN. L. Q. I, 2.
'For a general discussion of this point see 3 FREEM~AIN, oP. cit. supra note 2, § 1534.
"As a general rule the power of a guardian over the person of his ward is the same as
that of a father over the person of his child during the existence of the relationship," Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412, 418 (186o) ; see GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) § 191.
'Such a decree is the equivalent of an inquisition in lunacy and is in some states conclusive evidence of the incompetent's inability to contract, Philadelphia Ins. Co. v. Allison, 1O8
Me. 326, 8o Atl. 833 (1911). The incompetent may not sue in his own name, Anstock v.
Dir. Gen., I D. & C. 276 (Pa. 1922). One who is insane at the time of his trial on a criminal charge cannot be tried or acquitted during such insanity, State v. Noel, 3 N. J. Misc.
1154, 131 Atl. 70 (1925) ; (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 507.
' The state of residence may appoint a temporary guardian but this is in the nature of
a police regulation and in no way affects the incompetent's status, Ross v. Southwestern R.
Co., 53 Ga. 514 (1874) ; see Re Hubbard, 82 N. Y. 90, 93 (188o) ; see CONFLIcT OF LAWS
RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 193o) §§ 157, 158.

RECENT CASES

ground that the defendant had received insufficient notice to satisfy either the due
process clause8 or the conflict of laws requirement of reasonable notice which distinguishes judicial action from an arbitrary exercise of power.' The decisions are
in conflict on the question of what constitutes proper notice in this type of case.1"
The Missouri practice of permitting the local prothonotary to direct the proper
sheriff of the state of defendant's residence to serve process personally on the
1
The opinion
defendant, would seem to be an adequate solution of the problem.
of the court, then, is unsatisfactory because of the erroneous basis for the decision, and because it totally omits any discussion of what constitutes sufficient
notice in suits affecting status as distinguished from suits in personain.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTIONS-RIGHT

OF A CANDIDATE TO HAVE
pro-

His NAME APPEAR MoRE THAN ONCE UPON THE BALLOT-A statute'

vided that the name of a candidate nominated by a political party and also by an
independent body should appear only in the row containing the names of the
party's nominees, unless the independent body should have nominated candidates
for more than fifty per cent. of the offices to be filled. Plaintiff was nominated
for district attorney by both the Republican party and an independent group,
but his name, in accordance with the statute, was listed only among the party's
nominees, and the space under "District Attorney", in the horizontal row containing the names of the independent body's candidates, was left blank. Held,
that the statute was unconstitutional, as an unreasonable restriction upon the
right of the electorate to declare its choice. Crane V.Voorhis, 257 N. Y. 298,
178 N. E. 169 (I93i).
The legislature has the power to regulate elections, 2 and legislation which
merely regulates the exercise of the elective franchise, and does not actually amount
to a denial of the franchise itself, is not an abridgment of the constitutional guaranty 3 that "elections shall be free and equal". 4 Thus, it is obvious that the power
'See Fiehe v. Householder Co., g8 Fla. 627, 648, 125 So. 2, 9 (1929).
'The notice should be "of such a character that itwill have a tendency, ina reasonable

degree, to convey information to interested parties that the action affects their rights," Fenton v. Minnesota Ins. Co., 15 N. D. 365, 372, 3o9 N. W. 363, 366 (19o6) ; State v.Holtcamp,
218 Mo. App. 440, 277 S. W. 607 (1925) ; cf. Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Anderson, 155 Va.
518, 150 S. E. 413 (1929) (statute authorizing appointment of a committee for a person
already declared insane without notice to such insane person does not deny due process).
0 Michigan requires personal service, North v. Joslin, 59 Mich. 624, 26 N. W. 81o (1886).
However, notice by publication has been held sufficient, Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa 511, 129
N. W. 494 (911).
U

This practice is described in State v. Holtcamp, supra note 9; cf. Fiehe v. Householder

Co., supra note 8.
N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c.37, § 249, as amended by N. Y. Laws 1931, c.270.
O"When each (voter) has been afforded the opportunity and has been' provided with
reasonable facilities to vote, the constitution has been complied with. All else isregulation,
and lies
inthe sound discretion of the legislature, to whom alone such regulation iscommitted. Courts cannot hold such provisions unconstitutional because, in their judgment, they
are harsh or unwise." Todd v. The Board of Election Comm'rs, 104 Mich. 474, 48o, 64 N.
W. 496, 496 (895). Accord: Taylor v.Bleakley, 55 Kan. 1, 39 Pac. 1O45 (895) ; Winston
v. Moore, 244 Pa. 447, 91 Atl. 520 (1914) ; State v. Superior Court, 6o Wash. 370, 111 Pac.

233 (1910).
'The courts take the view that the right to vote is neither a property right nor a right
of person, but a mere political privilege which the legislature may regulate to any extent not
prohibited by the state or Federal Constitution. This being so, the courts refuse to, review
the discretion of the legislature, except in cases of such clear abuse of the power as actually
abridges or takes away the right of franchise. Taylor v.Bleakley; Winston v. Moore; State
v. Superior Court, all supra note 2; Wasson v. Woods, 265 Pa. 442, 3O9 Atl. 214 (1919);
Patterson v. Barlow,6o Pa. 54 (1869).
"This isthe wording of most state constitutions. The New York constitution provides
in art. i, § i, that "No member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of
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to frame an official ballot must carry with it the power to prescribe the conditions
with which a candidate must comply, in order to be entitled to a place thereon.;
The constitutional guaranty is no greater to electors than to candidates for office,"
and an election is none the less "free and equal" to a particular class of electors
if its candidate was unable to meet certain reasonable requirements, so as to entitle him to a place upon the ballot.7

Common sense and expediency dictate the

rule that since the whole purpose of election laws is to make for intelligent voting,' and this desideratum is to be attained only by using as short a ballot as possible, there must be reasonable limitations upon the number of names to be
listed.9 But since no space is saved by omitting the candidate's name from the
horizontal row which as already been allocated to the independent body, the statute in question has no raison d'tre. The decision in the instant case recognizes
that the desire to vote for a set of principles is as much a part of the elective
franchise as the desire to vote for a particular candidate, and the court, in holding
the statute unconstitutional as a denial of the franchise, acted in complete accord
with modem liberal ideas.10

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAXATION OF IMPORTS BY A STATE-Defendant

assessed the general property of the plaintiff for purposes of taxation and included therein the value of oil brought from Mexico in tank steamers, and
pumped into land tanks located in the state of Louisiana. Held, that the value
of the oil should be deducted from the assessment since a state may not tax
imports. Mexican Petroleum Corporation v. Louisiana Tax Comwmission, 138
So. 117 (La. 1931).

The Constitution provides that no state may lay any tax on imports without
the consent of Congress.1 Although this seems to have been aimed at the prevention of dissension among the states through its prohibition on the taxation of
imports qua imports by the seaboard states, 2 in the case of Brown v. Maryland,3
the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the
judgment of his peers."
'De Walt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. 529, 24 Atl. 186 (1892); Wigmore, Ballot Reform: Its
Costitutionality (1889) 23 Am. L. REv. 719.
' Wasson v. Woods, supra note 3, at 445, lO9 Atl. at 215; Wigmore, op cit. supra note 5,
at 731.
T

Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5, at 731.
'Principal case at 299, 178 N. E. at 170.

'The various statutes adopt different methods of limitation. E. g., one statute requires
a candidate who has been nominated by more than one party to designate the party on whose
ticket he wishes his name to appear; another provides that the candidate who received more
than one-half the total vote for the office at the primary shall be the sole nominee, and his
name alone shall be printed upon the official ballot; another requires that before a person
is entitled to have his name printed on the ballot as a party's nominee, his party must have
received a sufficient number of votes in a previous general election to fairly indicate that the
party has a reasonably sufficient membership.
10 Contra: State ex rel. Runge v. Anderson, IOO Wis. 523, 76 N. W. 482 (1898).
"Mere
party fealty and party sentiment, which influences men to desire to be known as members of
a particular organization, are not the subjects of constitutional care."
'U. S. CONST., Art. I, § 10, cl.2.
' Dissension would arise where goods were taxed as imports by a seaboard state and
then sold to the more inland states, thereby actually making the inland states bear the cost
of the tax. 5 MADISON, DEBATEs ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITM'rJON 485, 486 (Elliot's ed.
1843) ; i FEDERALIST 37 (802) ; see Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 440 (U. S. 1827).
3 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827). The case of Brown v. Maryland concerned the power of
the state to lay a tax on importers. In deciding that the importer could not be taxed on the
ground that a tax on the importer is in effect a tax on imports, the decision is undoubtedly
correct. But it is submitted that the sweeping language of C. J. Marshall goes much farther
than was necessary to decide the case before him, and the influence of his opinion on later
decisions is practically conclusive.
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the additional reason was put forward that it was for the purpose of preventing
the states from regulating foreign commerce. 4 Accordingly it was held that the
goods remained free from state taxation even after their importation. Rules
were laid down that the immunity from taxation continued while the goods remained the property of the importer in the original form or package in which
they were imported, but when the importer had so acted on the goods as to incorporate or mix them with the mass of property in the country, the distinctive
character as an import ceased.' Thus the character as an import is lost when
the goods have been sold," pledged for a loan,7 exposed for sale in broken packages, s or when the importer does acts which amount to incorporation. There is
dicta to the effect that the property would lose its distinctive character as an import and become subject to taxation if it were maintained for purposes of indiscriminate sale, 10 or if it were held for a period of time longer than is necessary
for its manufacture." In the instant case it cannot be said that the goods arrived
in a package within the meaning of the term. One case,'12 which has been criticized, 13 held under facts similar to the present case that the pumping of the oil
In Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566 (1878) it was held that an auctioneer who sold
goods for an importer was exempt from a sales tax on auctioneers to the extent of those
sales. A like rule of rule is applied to those engaged in the sale of articles of interstate commerce: Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 (i88o); American Fertilizer Co. v. Board of
Agriculture, 43 Fed. 6og (C. C. E. D. N. C. 189o); State v. Byles, 22 Wyo. 136, 136 Pac.

115 (1913) ; see (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 460.
It has even been held that the proceeds of the sale of imported goods are exempt from.
state taxation: Gelpi v. Schenck, 48 La. Ann. 1535, 21 So. 115 (1896). But this decision is
criticized adversely in Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Board of Assessors, 148 La. 1057, 88 So.
397 (ig2i). And where the proceeds have become mingled with other goods of the state
they are no longer exempt from taxation: Burkd v. Wells, 208 U. S. 14, 28 Sup. Ct. 193
(1914), where it was said, at 24, "And we think the same principle may be applied to the
proceeds of the sale of the goods, which, while not directly taxable as such, any more than
the goods themselves, may be dealt with by the owner in such wise as to become subject to
taxation as other property."
'By Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 the Constitution gives the exclusive power to the federal government to regulate foreign commerce. See Brown v. Maryland, suepra note 2, at 446 et seq.
But since it is admitted that the state cannot tax an import as import, does the state
regulate foreign commerce when it levies a tax on all goods of a certain nature within its
borders? To the extent that the domestic goods are taxed and the foreign goods exempt,
the domestic goods are certainly placed at a disadvantage. As to the exemption of foreign
goods where there is a general tax on a certain type o,f personal, property see Low et ai. v.
Austin, 13 Wall. 29 (U. S. 1871) ; In re Appeal of Pitkin v. Brooks, 193 Ill. 268, 61 N. E.
1048 (91oi).
GThese rules are paraphrased from Brown v. Maryland, supra note 2, at 441, and they
can be found in almost every case on the subject.
'I COOLEY, TAXATION (1924) § 413; Waring v. The Mayor, 8 Wall. 11o (U. S. 1868);
Southern Pac. Co. v. City of Calexico et al., 288 Fed. 634 (S. D. Cal. 1923). In the latter
case it was also held that the mere offering for sale was not enough to deprive the article of
its character as an import.
'Southern Pac. Co. v. City of Calexico, supra note 6. This case anounces the rule of
"beneficial user" by the importer to determine whether there has been incorporation of the
import into the mass of goods.
'Low et al. v. Austin, supfra note 4; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 21 Sup. Ct. 132

(goo).
9

Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U. S. 124, 48 Sup. Ct. 227 (1928); cf. Gulf
Fisheries Co. v. Darrouzet, 17 F. (2d) 374 (S. D. Tex. 192o).
"See American Manufacturing, Co. v. City of St. Louis, 238 Mo. 267, 276, 142 S. W.
297, 299 (1911).

'See City of Galveston v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., infra note 12, at 208.
" Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. City of South Portland, 121 Me. 128, 115 Atl. 9oo (1922).
'This case has been criticized in City of Galveston v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., 15 F.
(2d) 208 (S. D. Tex.) where it was said at 208, "It is a matter of hornbook knowledge
that the original package statement of Justice Marshall was an illustration, rather than a
formula, and its application is evidentiary, and not substantive."' See (1926) 11 MINN. L.
REv. 368 which seems to have misapprehended the ratio decidendi of City of Galveston v.
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into the land tanks constituted a breaking of the original package. Since this
was the only practical way to import oil, the court rightly held that the mere
state under the given circumstances was insufficient
presence of the oil in the
14
to subject it to taxation.

CONTRACTS-PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CONSIDERATION

-The plaintiff had a claim against G's estate which the defendant, G's widow,
made a written promise to pay, giving a mortgage as security. In reliance on
the promise the plaintiff made no claim against the estate within the period
allowed. Later he sued to foreclose the mortgage. Held, that there was no consideration for the promise but that it was nevertheless binding as the plaintiff
relied thereon to his detriment. Saunders v. Galbraith, 178 N. E. 34 (Ohio
App. 1931).
The approval indicated by the court of this modification of the bargain
theory of consideration is significant, even though the court might have followed
well-established precedents 1 by treating the forbearance as the acceptance of a4
unilateral contract. 2 The Restatement,3 apparently the sole authority relied on,
recognizes promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration within certain
limits. Thus the action induced by the promise must be substantial; the action
should have been reasonably expected by the promisor; and, by way of caution,
it is to be recognized if injustice can only be avoided in this way.5 In view of
this last restriction the practical advantages of such a modification can hardly
be questioned-assuming that the law aims to provide justice. The problem
is then not should we enforce but upon what legal theory can we enforce. The
arguments in the Restatement for promissory estoppel are (I) that historically it is justifiable as the action of assumpsit was originally one of deceit for
the breach of a promise relied on 6 and (2) that, in spite of ingenious attempts
Mexican Petroleum Corp., although approving of the decision; cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. City
of Calexico, supra note 6, where the court held that cotton removed from its bale, compressed and then repacked did not lose its character as an import.
"' The court determined that heating of the oil on board the ship to make it flow easier,
pumping it into land tanks and having oil in those tanks from a, previous shipment did not
deprive the oil of its character as an import, especially since this left over oil could not be
conveniently removed.
'Nuhn v. Bank of Vermillion Co., 29 Ohio App. 97, 163 N. E. 45 (1928) ; Devecmon v.
Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 14 Atl. 464 (1888).
2 The forbearance must, of course, clearly be the price requested by the promise. See
Strong v. Sheffield, 144 N. Y. 392, 394, 39 N. E. 392, 393 (1895) ; WILL=sTOX, CoNtAcrs
(1920) § 136. Such appears to be the situation in the instant case. It is clear that there was
no promise to forbear and certainly the defendant did not expect to pay if a claim was made
against the estate. If this criticism is justified the case should not have been decided on the
ground of equitable estoppel; and its importance, as a result, is considerably impaired.
' CONTRAcTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § go. A few courts have also recognized
this modification: Switzer v. Gertenbach, 122 Ill. App. 26 (19o5) ; Beatty v. Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N. E. 432 (1898) ; Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N. W. 365
(1898) ; see Allegheny College v. National Chat. Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 374, 159 N. E. 173,
175 (927).

' The court says at p. 35: "We are content, however, to take the restatement as the lav
of this state without exploring its soundness, and hold that of its own vigor it is adequate
authority. This is not to say that the restatement is of necessity perfect. . . . We only
hold that he who would not have it followed has the burden of demonstrating its unsoundness."

rOp. cit. supra note 3, at 138, 297 (explanatory note to § go) ; cf. WELISTON, Cox-

TRACTS (1920) § 139.
6Op. cit. supra note 3, at 293.
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by the courts to find consideration, it is the only logical theory on which to explain a number of accepted modern holdings.7 The proposition is apparently
to recognize the fundamental principle underlying these tenuous or illogical decisions and extend its applicability to other promises which are not supported by
consideration. This is a very convincing argument. Moreover, such an expansion of contract principles, viewed from a broader aspect, is in harmony with8
the recent tendency to extend tort duties to include gratuitous undertakings.
These two developments 9 converge to bridge the gap between torts and contracts
and provide the liability demanded by common sense for the nonperformance of
a wide range of gratuitous promises.
CORPORATIONS-CONVERSION-LIABILITY OF CORPORATION FOR REFUSAL
TO TRANSFER SHARES BECAUSE OF BY-LAws--Defendant corporation refused

to transfer on its books the stock purchased by the plaintiff, because the stock
was not first offered for sale to the stockholders of record as required by a by-

law of the corporation. The plaintiff sued for conversion of the shares. Held,
that, although the refusal was wrongful, an action of conversion did not lie.
Robertson v. Nichwles Co., 253 N. Y. Supp. 76 (193).
Corporations prescribing in by-laws that the transfer of shares on their
books shall be a prerequisite to the status of stockholder are under a duty to make
such transfer upon the application of a bona-fide purchaser for value,, made in
conformity with the regulations in the by-laws.2 The power to make by-laws for
the transfer of stock is confined to administrative practices such as the selection
of a transfer agent and the fixing of the mode of transfer.3 Although the state
may in the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives grant a charter containing
provisions preventing the unconditional transfer of stock, 4 such restrictions imposed exclusively by the by-laws of a corporation are usually held to be void
as an unreasonable restraint upon the alienation of property." Hence a by-law
7

Ibid. 294-297: WMLISTON, CONTRACTS § 139, and cases there cited. The holdings submitted are: promises not to foreclose a mortgage which are relied on; licenses to use real
estate relied on; charitable subscriptions; promises of gratuitous' bailees; waivers of statute
of limitations, etc.; promises in expectation of marriage. While the classification is accepted
it is submitted by way of criticism: that the weight of authority does not recognize any liability for the revocation of licenses, WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 3H1, and cases cited; that charitable subscriptions are enforced chiefly because of public policy and regardless of reliance,
Billig, They Problem of Considerationin Charitable Subscriptions (927)
12 CORN. L. Q.
467, 481; that the promises of gratuitous bailees are more properly enforceable in tort, Note
(0923) 9 CORN. L. Q. 54, 55; that the waiver cases are only explainable if the promise was
made before the defence arose, WLLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 689, 693.
Note (923) 23 COL. L. REV. 57.3; WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 138.
' The modification of contract principles is an essential factor.
Even if tort principles
were extended to afford liability for the non-performance of all gratuitous promises, as suggested, Note (0931) 45 HARV. L. REv. 164, it would still be necessary to adopt promissory
estoppel in some cases to provide adequate damages, Ibid. 169. In tort the recovery would
always be the loss sustained and never the profit which would have been derived from the
promise. Consider in this connection charitable subscriptions, promises in expectation of
marriage, etc., supra note 5.
'Harris v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 75 Okla. 1o5, 182 Pac. 85 (I919); Rowe v.
Border City Garnetting Co., 4o R. I. 394, ioi Atl. 223 (917).
2 Star Mutual Tel. Co. v. Longfellow, 85 Kan. 353, 116 Pac. .5o6 (11)
; cf. Kjellman v.
Scandia Fish Co., 128 Ill. App. 544 (19o6).
'Morris v. Hussong Dyeing Machine Co., 8I N. J. Eq. 256, 86 Atl. io26 (1913) ; Kinnan v. Sullivan, 26 App. Div. MI3, 5o N. Y. Supp. 95 (1898) ; 2 THOmPSON, CORPORATIONS
(3d ed. 1927) § 1127.

O'Brien v. Cummings, 13 Mo. App. I97 (1883).
State er rel. Howland v. Olympia Veneer Co., 138 Wash. I44, 244 Pac. 261 (1926);
In re Claus, 67 Wis. 401, 29 N. W. 582 (1886). Contra: Star Mut. Tel. Co. v. Longfellow,
supra note 2.
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which provides, as in the principal case, that the transferor must offer his stock
for sale to stockholders of record before there can accrue to the transferee a
right of transfer is void,6 whether or not the transferee had notice of the regulation. 7 By the heavy weight of authority the wrongful refusal of a corporation
to transfer stock is an exercise of dominion over the shares which constitutes a
conversion s and the transferee is entitled to recover the full value of the shares
as of the time of demand and refusal to transfer
The court, in the instant
case, reached an adverse holding on the ground that to permit a corporation to
gain title to its shares upon the satisfaction of a judgment in trover would be
a violation of a statute '0 which provides that a corporation may not purchase
its own stock except from surplus. The tenor of the statute indicates that the
legislature intended that the statute should extend only to the voluntary impairment of capital of a corporation through the purchase of its own stock and not
to situations where the title to stock has been acquired through the satisfaction
of a judgment in trover." Even conceding that the statute did apply, the right
to maintain an action of conversion should not be categorically denied but should
be conditional upon the existence of surplus.

CRIMINAL LAW-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT-INVALIDITY OF "WORTHELESS
CHECK" ACT BECAUSE OF ABATEMENT BY PAYMENT BEFORE TRIAL-Defendant

was convicted for violating a statute ' by knowingly issuing a present-dated
'Bloede v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 Atl. 1127 (1896) ; Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 21
R. I. 9, 41 Atl. 258 (1898) ; 2 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1129. Contra: Fopiano v.
Italian Catholic Cemetery Ass'n, 26o Mass. 99, 156 N. E. 708 (1927).
" The authorities cited in supra note 6 have decided that the by-laws in question are void
because they hinder the free alienation of property, without even alluding to notice to the
transferee. Therefore, it can be inferred that these by-laws are void regardless of notice to
the transferee. Contra: Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust Co. v. Home Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447,
24 S. W. 129 (1893).
'London, Paris & Am. Bank v. Aronstein, 117 Fed. 6oi (C. C. A. 9th, 19o2); Gorham
v. Massillon Iron & Steel Co., 284 Ill. 594, 12o N. E. 467 (ii8);
Herrick v. Humphrey
Hdw. Co., 73 Neb. 8og, lO3 N. W. 685 (1905) ; 2 CooK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 392.
'Dooley v. Gladiator Gold Mines Co., 134 Iowa 468, iog N. W. 864 (19o6) ; Cincinnati
Finance Co. v. Booth, Ix Ohio St. 361, 145 N. E. 543 (1924) ; see Siegel v. Riverside Box
& Lumber Co., 89 N. 1. L. 595, 596, 99 Atl. 407, 408 (1916). For a discussion of the minority view, which holds that the measure of damages is the highest market value of the stock
between the time of conversion and the end of the trial, see 2 SEnwlcx, DAMAGES (gth ed.
1912) c. 22.
"' N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 6o, § 58, "...
nor shall any corporation
make any distribution of assets to any, of its stockholders . . . unless the value of its
assets remaining after the payment of such dividend or after such distribution of assets, as
the case may be, shall at least be equal to the aggregate amount of its debts and liabilities
including capital or capital stock as the case may be. . . . In case any such distribution
of assets shall be made, the directors in whose administration the same; shall have been declared or made . . . shall be liable jointly and severally to such corporation and the
creditors thereof..
'Throughout, the statute cited in supra note Io regulates the voluntary activity of the
corporation and its directors in the disposition of the assets of the corporation as is evidenced by such phrases as, "nor shall any corporation . . . make any distribution of assets
to any of its stockholders . . .", and '.
.
the directors in whose administration the
same shall have been declared or made."
'S. D. Laws (1923) c. 121, § I: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make
. any check . . . on any bank for payment of money . . . knowing at the time
of the making, . . . that he has not sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with such bank
* . . with which to pay such check . . . upon presentment." § 3 reads: "That in any
case where a prosecution is begun under this act, the defendant shall have a right, upon application made for that purpose before trial, to have said action abated . . . on paying
into court the amount of the check and the costs of the case." § 5: ". . . Nothing in the
act shall apply in cases where checks are honored'by the bank."
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check in payment of an account without funds in the bank to satisfy payment
upon presentment. Held, that the defendant should be released as the statute
was unconstitutional by imposing imprisonment for debt. 2 State v. Portwood,
238 N. W. 879 (S, D. 1931).

The majority of American jurisdictions have abolished imprisonment for
debt except in cases of fraud, but with seeming unanimity the practice of obtaining property by false pretenses has been condemned. 4 From this type of statute
have come the "worthless check" acts which provide punishment for the mere
issuance of a bad check with intent to defraud.' Most of these statutes expressly
require a fraudulent intent,0 and in some jurisdictions the uttering of a worthless check creates a rebuttable presumption as to the intent.7 The instant statute
differs from the customary one in that the drawer may abate the prosecution
before trial by paying the check and costs, and in that the statute is inapplicable
when the check has been honored.8 It was held unconstitutional by construing
the whole statute as a unit, 9 and thus interpreting the punishment as being for
non-satisfaction, rather than for the issuance. The sections providing for abatement, however, may be considered a means of condonation, as a provision in a
statute providing for payment within a certain period after notice of protest
was so held,10 or the requirement of a fraudulent intent may be reasonably
inferred, and the instant provisions construed as rebutting the prima facie evidence of such an intent created by the issuance of a bad check." A similar statute was held constitutional in State v. Azery,' 2 where the statute was interpreted
as creating a new and distinct offense, demoralizing to business. These statutes
have been primarily legislated for the benefit of commerce, as modern business
is conducted upon the integrity of checks and similar instruments, 13 and unless
those who issue worthless checks are punished, business will suffer. To effectuate this purpose the instant statute should have been construed as punishing
the issuance of a bad check, rather than non-satisfaction, and hence should have
been held constitutional.
2 S. D. Const., Art. 6, § 15 forbids imprisonment for debt founded on contract.
' The instant statute was held unconstitutional as to post-dated checks in State v. Nelson, 237 N. W. 766 (S. D. 1931). See (1931) 3o MIcH. L. REv. 299.
' Note (1928) 6 N. C. L. Rlv. 300.
'PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §§ 7890-7893, is a typical example of these statutes.
'State v. Yarboro, 194 N. C. 498, 140 S. E. 217 (3927) and Commonwealth v. Glancy,
3o Dauph. 355, 9 D. & C. 721 (Pa. 1927) hold the intent to defraud is, the ingredient of the
offense. Where the statute does not mention the intent, the courts generally hold that such
an intent is required. Neidlinger v. State, 17 Ga. App. 8ii, 88 S. E. 687 (1916) ; State v.
Alphonse, 154 La. 950, 98 So. 430 (1923). Contra: State v. Avery, III Kans. 588, 207 Pac.
838, 23 A. L. R. 453 (1922). The statute is similar to the one in the instant case, but the
court held that the legislature might, for the protection of the public require persons to act
at their peril and could punish the doing of a forbidden act without regard to intention.
'Berry v. State, 153 Ga. 169, III S. E. 669 (1922) ; PA. STAT. (West, 392o) § 7892.
' §§ 3, 5 supra note I.
'Instant case at 88o. See I COIOLY, CONSTITUTIONAL LimiTATIONS (8th ed. 3927) 362.
State v. Cunningham, 9o W. Va. 8o6, III S. E. 835 (1922) held that payment of money
within 2o days after notice of protest or acceptance of the property as paymene in full absolved the defendant from punishment. People v. Weaver, 96 Cal. App. I, 274 Pac. 361
(1929) said the fact that other checks were taken up would not relieve the defendant, but
that fact might be considered in the mitigation of the punishment. A like interpretation of
the instant provision is suggested in (1929) 2 DAX. L. REV. 493.
a'State v. Parsons, 6 N. J. Misc. 76, 34o Atl. 13, aff'd, 142 AtI. 918 (1928) ; PA. STAT.
(West, 1920) § 7892.
" Supra note 6, at 591, 592.
'State v. Avery and State v. Yarboro, both supra note 6, say that the issuance of a
worthless check destroys public confidence in credit and therefore the regulation is an exercise of the police power for the public good.
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EQUITY-INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN POLICE OFFICERS FROM MAKING UNAUTHORIZED RAIDS UPON BUSINESS INTERESTs-Plaintiff leased a hall and

organized a "Marathon" dance contest which was conducted under the surveillance and with the approval of the municipal police. Defendant, the county
sheriff, threatened to stop the contest as illegal if the plaintiff refused to pay
$5000. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the officer from taking such action. Held, that
a temporary injunction would issue to protect plaintiff's business interests from

such an unwarranted invasion. Ruty v. Huelsenbeck, 156 Atl. 922 (N. J. 1931).
The maxim "Equity will not act either to enforce or to enjoin criminal proceedings" is frequently cited as a rule of law.1 However, equity will act indirectly to restrain criminal prosecutions by enjoining the official in charge of
such proceedings when such action is unjustifiable. Hence an injunction will
issue to restrain unauthorized and unwarranted acts by police 2 against alleged
crimes or misdemeanors, as it will against other public officers,3 where an irreparable injury is threatened to a property right of the plaintiff for which he has
no adequate redress at law. The act of the officer sought to be enjoined may be
unlawful either because he is acting under a void statute 4 or, as in this case,
because he is exceeding the authority granted him by a valid statute., In either
case the officer, denuded of his authority," is enjoined as a pri'vate individual
from committing an unlawful act.7 A public officer cannot, of course, be enjoined from doing any act which his duty requires him to perform." Furthermore when he is given discretionary powers, an injunction will only issue9 if
there is a gross abuse of discretion. 10 Thus, a public officer whose duty it is
'In

re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 210, 8 Sup. Ct. 482, 487 (1887) ; 52 Ala. 198 (1878);

BEACH,
MODERN EQUITY PRACTICE (1900)
2

§ 761.

Burns v. M'Adoo, 113 App. Div. 165, 99 N. Y. Supp. 5I (I9O6); Hagan v. M'Adoo,
113 App. Div. 506, 99 N. Y. Supp. 255 (I9O6) ; Hall v. Dunn, 52 Ore. 475, 97 Pac. 811 (i9o8).
But cf.. Delaney v. Flood, 183 N. Y. 323,, 76 N. E. 209 (I9O6) where the court refused to
enjoin a police captain from making periodic searches of plaintiff's hotel because the liquor
license granted by city made the licensee subject to such searches.
' New Yorker Staats Zeitung v. Nolan, 89 N. J. Eq. 387, 1O5 Atl. 72 (1918) (town
officials enjoined from prohibiting circulation of German newspapers) ; Brex v. Smith, IO4
N. J. Eq. 386, 146 Atl. 34 (1929) (public prosecutor was enjoined from compelling the entire personnel of the Newark police force to submit their bank accounts to his examination) ;
State v. Cass County et a[., 17 N. D. 285, 11s N. W. 675 (1908) (pure food commissioner
was enjoined from issuing circulars condemning plaintiff's wheat) ; Terrell v. Kasch, IO S.
W. (2d) 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (Commissioner of Agriculture restrained from registering cotton grown by other growers as Kasch quality).
'Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 23, 28 Sup. Ct. 44I (I98) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33,
36 1Sup.
7 (9,5).
'TheCt.defendant
was acting under a valid statute, 4 N. J. Comp. STAT. (910) p.
5712,
but he was given authority only to act where there was an actual violation of the statute;
the defendant contended that he had warned the plaintiff not to engage in the dance and
plaintiff had disregarded such warning. The statute gave the defendant no right to adjudge
the lawful character of a future act; he was authorized to arrest only for misdemeanors
actually committed.
6 In Hagan v. M'Adoo, supra note 2, the court said, "When police go outside of the prescribed ways and methods of administering and enforcing the criminal law and in so doing
violate the rights of property, person or house of the individual they are not engaged in administering and enforcing the criminal law, but are common trespassers."
'In Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 621, 32 Sup. Ct. .340, 345 (1912) it was
said: "In this (issuance of an injunction) there is no attempt to restrain a court from trying
persons charged with crime, or the grand jury from the exercise of its functions, but the injunction binds the defendant not to resort to criminal procedure to enforce illegal demands."
See also Southern Exporting Co. v. Mayor etc. of Ensley, 116 Fed. 756 (N. D. Ala. 1902).
'9 Littleton v. Burgess, 13 Wyo. 261, 82 Pac. 864 (i9o5).
Holt v. Smith, 149 Ga. 48, 99 S. E. 119 (1919); Boyle v. Rock Island Coal Mining
Co., 125 Okla. 137, 256 Pac. 883 (1925).
"In School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 23 Sup. Ct. 33 (19o2), a
postmaster refused to deliver mail to plaintiff on ground that it was conducting an unlawful
business merely because the postmaster did not believe in plaintiff's method of cure.
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to grant licenses to carry on a business, may not arbitrarily and capriciously
refuse to renew a license previously granted."- The defendant's act must
threaten a property right; 12 a mere threat of arrest or of continued arrests will
not be enjoined. 13 Equity has thus assumed the anomalous position of valuing
property rights more highly than the rights of personal liberty. The reason suggested I4 for this policy is that rights of liberty are amply safeguarded from
unwarranted interference by the writ of habeas corpus. This theory, however,
fails to recognize that irreparable injury to one's reputation is suffered by the
stigma of an arrest. In view of the present tendency 1 to extend the concept of
property rights, it seems that the right to a good name and character should be
recognized as a property right and fully protected from the ruthless hands of
unprincipled police officials.
INCOME TAX-RESERVATION OF GROUND RENT AS REALIZABLE GAINPetitioner sold real estate in Pennsylvania, receiving cash and reserving a ground
rent which the purchaser agreed to pay within ten years. Held, that not only
the cash but also the ground rent was present realizable value so that the full

profits were immediately taxable. Pennsylvania Co. v. Commiissioner of Interval Revenue, 52 F. (2d) 6oi (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).

Ground rent, a remnant of the feudal system,' has largely fallen into disuse.2 It is created by a deed which merely purports to sell and convey the property for a certain sum and to reserve a ground rent capitalized at another sum,
the two amounts aggregating the full value of the property.8 It is to be noted
that the right to ground rent which is an interest in land 4 has not been conveyed.5
Strictly speaking, therefore, the ground rent was not a part of the conveyance
and cannot be treated as immediate gain arising out of the transaction. It could
be so included only when the right to the ground rental has been extinguished
by payment; for at that time the original owner has finally conveyed the interest
which he had retained in the realty, and has thereby completed the transaction.
'Walker v. City of Birmingham, 216 Ala. 206,
Thomasville, 156 Ga. 260, 118 S. E. 854 (923).

112 So. 823, (1927) ;

Brown v. City of

'The right to carry on a lawful business is such a property right as is recognized by

equity. Walker v. City of Birmingham, supra note ii; Brown v. City of Thomasville, supra

note ii; School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, supra note Io.
' Barrett v. Rietta, 207 Ala. 6.5I, 93 So. 636 (1922) ; Eden Musee American Co. v. Bingham, 125 App. Div. 780, 11o N. Y. Supp. 210 (I908). Contra: Foley v. Ham, io2 Kan. 66,
169 Pac. 183 (1917).
"'Fleischmann, Injunctions Restraining Prosecutions'UnderInvalid Statutes (1923) 9
A. B. A. J. 169 at 173.
'In International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 39 Sup. Ct. 68
(1915), Justice Pitney said, "In order to sustain the jurisdiction of equity over the controversy, we need not affirm any general, and absolute property in the news as such. The
rule that a court of equity concerns itself only in the protection of property rights treats
any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right."
'"The modern ground rent is a direct descendant of the old feudal system of holding
land. When military tenures were abolished, the payment of rent to the overlord was substituted for the old military services." NICHOLSON, PE-NSYLVANIA LAW OF REAL ESTATE:
(1924) 61; ROBEY, REAL ESTATE AND CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA (1922)
2
ROBEY, op. cit. supra note I, at 147.
'See Harrison's Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 211, 66 Atl. 354 (1907).

146.

'Mitchell v. Steinmetz, 97 Pa. 251 (88) ; see Ingersoll v. Sergeant, I Whart. 336, 359
(Pa. 1836) ; footnote to McQuesney v. Hiester, 33 Pa. 435, 445 (1859) ; NICHOLSON, op. cit.
supra note I, at 65.
'Mitchell v. Steinmetz; see Ingersoll v. Sergeant; footnote to McQuesney v. Hiester,
all supra note 4; NIciOLSON, op. cit. supra note I, at 6.
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However, as to the type of sale in question, a Treasury Regulation6 declares
immediately taxable all profits realized from "deferred-payment" sales where
there has been a substantial initial payment.7 A transaction reserving a ground
rent is essentially a deferred-payment sale," and is therefore to be given the legal
effect of such sale.' In applying the above regulation the Court in the instant
case disregards, for income tax purposes, the unique legal significance that Pennsylvania ground rents have in so many other situations.10 Thus, despite the
reservation of a ground rent, realty sales in Pennsylvania are subject to federal
income taxation in the same manner as they ordinarily are in other states." This
follows closely the recent tendency of federal courts not to restrict the power
of taxation by fine distinctions and legal niceties.' 2 As Justice Holmes has
pointed out,13 the income tax laws have their own criteria of what is and what
is not taxable, irrespective of local law.

INSURANCE-AcCIDENTAL MEANS AND SLUNSTROKE-SUNSTROKE AS A
DISEASE AND EXTERNAL MARK OF INjURY-The insured died as a result of sun-

stroke sustained while playing golf. His life insurance policy with the defendant
insurer provided for double indemnity in case of death caused by "bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means . . . and if
such accident is evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the
body" and it excepted any recovery for death resulting from disease. Held, that
there could be no recovery of double indemnity because the bodily injury was
not effected by accidental means and because a flushed face is not a wound or

contusion. Paist v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., decided by L. S. District Court,
Eastern District of Pa., Nov. 12, 1931.
An agreement of this character in any insurance policy requires not only
death before liability will be incurred but also that the injury causing death, be
'U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 44.
It may be noted that a regulation by a department of government has the force and effect
of law, unless it is in conflict with express statutory provision. Faucus Machine Co. v. United
States, 282 U. S. 375, 51 Sup. Ct. 144 (193i) ; see Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States,
251 U. S. 342, 349, 40 Sup. Ct. 155, 157 (1920).

' This has been declared by U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 44 to be about one-fourth of the
purchase price. The regulation states that such sales are distinguished from sales on the installment plan (under which deferred payments are not taxable) by the substantial character
of the initial payment and also usually by a relatively small number of payments.
'The purchase price is the initial payment and the ground rent is comparable to the deferred payments.
'In a deferred-payment sale, "...
the obligations assumed by the buyer are much better secured because of the margin afforded by the substantial first payment, and experience
shows that the greater number of such sales are eventually carried out according to their
terms. If these obligations have a fair market value, they are to be considered as the equivalent of cash and the profit realized from the transaction is taxable income for the year in
which the initial payment was made and the obligation assumed." U. S. Treas. Reg. 65,
Art. 46.
In a sale reserving a ground rent, the right to the rent is secured by the power to distrain or to regain possession of the land in default of payment. Roam', qp. cit. smpre note I,
at 148. And if the fair market value of the property is amply sufficient to secure the ground
rent, as in the principal case, it is a "gilt-edged security of the highest type." Principal case
at 602.
10 Thus, executors of an estate were denied commissions on ground rent because it was
held to be an interest in realty reserved to the grantor, and therefore not converted into
money. Harrison's Estate, supra note 3.
Principal case at 6o2.
See (1930) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 233; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378, 50 Sup.
Ct. 336, 336 (193o). In United States v. Tyler, 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1930), on a
question of taxation, the Court very similarly disregarded the Pennsylvania common law concept of estates by the entirety.
' See Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U. S. 333, 337, 49 Sup. Ct. 337, 338 (1929).
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effected through accidental means.1 The means and not the result must be accidental. Medical authorities do not agree upon the exact cause of sunstroke,2
but the court in the instant case recognized what seems to be the better rule that
sunstroke 3 is not a disease. 4 Yet, granting that sunstroke was not a disease, the
court denied double indemnity, saying that a flushed face was not a sufficient external mark to satisfy the clause in the policy requiring visible contusions on the
body before payment would be made.' It overlooked the fact that slight pallor,
trembling, perspiration and temporary reddening of the skin have been held
to satisfy similar clauses. 6 The main legal controversy in the construction of
such policies exists in the determination of whether the means effecting7 the
injuries which resulted in the insured's death or disability were accidental. It
has been held, as in the instant case, that the insured intentionally exposed himself to the rays of the sun, and therefore the means could not be said to be accidental but voluntary.
Opposed to this is a second line of reasoning, which
is used in most poisoning 9 and in some over-exertion cases,'1 that the insured
never intended to expose himself in such a manner as to be sunstruck." A third
approach, i. e., that an unforeseen element, susceptibility to heat, has so affected
if, in the act which precedes the injury something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted . . . through acci-

dental means." U. S. Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755 (1889) ;
Cames v. Iowa State Tray. Men's Ass'n, io6 Iowa 281, 76 N. W. 683 (1898). For a detailed
review of the problem see CORNELIUS, ACCIDENTAL MEANS (1916) ; VANCE, INSURANCE (2d
ed. 193o) § 869.

'6 NELSON, LoosE LEAF LIVING MEDICINE (1924) 717 E.; HILL, HEAii HYPERPYREPIA,
I BRIT. M. J. (i92o) 397; WiLcox, I BRIT. M. J. (1920) 392 (autointoxication) ; HEARNE,

4 BRIT. M. J. (1919) 516 (suppression of perspiration).
' It is encouraging to note that medical and legal authorities agree that sunstroke may
be caused by excessive heat from sources of other than solar origin. Mather v. London
Guarantee and Acc. Co., 125 Minn. I86, 145 N. W. 963 (1914) ; CECIL, TEXT Boox: OF MEDICINE (1930) 524.
'This is in accord with the view expressed orally by Henry C. Bazett, Chair of Physiology, School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, author of PhysiologicalResponses to
Heat (927) 7 PHYSIOLOGICAL REVIEW 531. Under the usual policy the accident must be
the sole cause of injury but recovery is allowed where a previously non-existing disease
arises from the injury. Cary v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 127 Wis. 67, io6 N. W. 1055
(igo6) ; (1q26) 25 MICH. L. REv. 467. There is no recovery where the disease previously
existed. White v. Standard Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 95 Minn. 77, 1O3 N. W. 735. Prior to
recognition that sunstroke was not a disease, recovery was refused on that ground. Sinclair
v. Maritime P. Ass. Co., 3 El. & El. 476 (186i)
; Dozier v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 46 Fed.
446 (W. D. Mo. 1891). It was to avoid this conclusion that sunstroke was a disease that
it was specifically mentioned in the policies thereafter as a risk of the company.
' Obviously the purpose of such a clause is to avoid the perpetration of perjury, and
therefore such clauses are often construed as applying only to cases of bodily injury and not
of death. McGlinchey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 8o Me. 251, 14 Atl. 13 (1888) ; Paul v. Travelers Ins. Co., n2 N. Y. 472, 2o N. E. 347 (1889); Eggenberger v. Guarantee Mut. Acc.
Ass'n, 41 Fed. 172 (C. C. A. 8th, 1889). In cases where such a clause has been held applicable to death of insured it is construed as requiring only proof that the means of death
were external and accidental and not marks upon the body at the time of death. Menneilley
v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 148 N. Y. 596, 43 N. E. 54 (1896).
oFeis v. United States Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 777, 201 N. W. 5.58 (1924) ; Horsfall v. Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 32 Wash. 132, 72 Pac. 1o28 (1903).
" 5 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INS. LAW (1929) § 1154.
'Semancik v. Continental Cas. Co., 56 Pa. Super. 392 (1914) ; Continental Cas. Co. v.
Pittman, 145 Ga. 641, 89 S. E. 716 (ii6)
; Note (1915) 64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 837.
' Woods v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 42 S. V. (2d) 499 (1931) ; Johnson 4i. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N. Y., 184 Mich. 4o6, 151 N. W. 593 (I915).
" Standard Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 588, 53 S. W. 49 (1899) ; Horsfall v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note 6. Contra: Feder v. Iowa S. T. M. A., 107
Iowa 538, 78 N. W. 252 (1899) ; Note (1926) 14 GEO. L. REV. 409.
' Elsey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N. Y., 187 Ind. 447, 120 N. E. 42 (1918) ; Pack v.
Prudential Cas. Co., 17o Ky. 47, 185 S. W. 496 (1916) ; Gallagher v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of
N. Y., 163 App. Div. 556, 148 N. Y. Supp. ioi6 (1914); Bryant v. Commonwealth Casualty
Co., 182 S.W. 673 (Tex. 1916) ; 5 JOYCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1918) § 2879a.
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the means voluntarily employed that it makes them accidental, would seem to be
preferable. 12 By adopting it we avoid the impasse reached by a comparison of
the first two lines of reasoning and at the same time avoid defeating the purpose
of the policy by giving effect to the ordinary understanding of the layman who
applies for such insurance.
MORTGAGES-RIGHT TO RENT UPON DEFAULT-Upon the mortgage be-

coming due and payable, plaintiff, mortgagee, notified the tenants, whose leases
post-dated the mortgage, to pay the rents to him. The owner distrained for
these rents, whereupon the tenants started actions of replevin for the recovery
of their property. Plaintiff filed a bill in equity to restrain the owner from
collecting the rents which had accrued between the time of the notice and the
foreclosure sale. Held, on appeal from a decree for the plaintiff, that plaintiff's
notice put an end to the right of the owner to collect the rents, and justified the
tenants in paying them to the mortgagee. Ranilal v. Jersey Mtge. Investment
Co., et al., opinion filed January 5, 1932 (Supreme Court of Pa.).
This case is an adoption by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania of the recent decision of the Superior Court in Bulger v. Wilderinan.1 Its chief significance lies in the fact that it is the first case on the subject in the highest tribunal
of this state. The decision goes no further than the Bulger case, except in one
respect-and this is really not essential to the decision. The court, speaking
through Simpson, J., construed the clause conveying to the mortgagee the property described, together with the "rents, issues and profits thereof", as having
special importance, and which the mortgagee may enforce according to its terms.
This clause is merely part of the usual form, and is found in most mortgages.
It is doubtful whether this clause should be given the effect of an assignment of
the rents; its legal import seems to be no greater than that already contained
in the mortgage proper.2
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS-RATE REGULATION-REASONABLENESS OF
MINIMUM RATES WHERE THER Is DESTRUCTIVE COMPETITION-Plaintiff adequately supplied gas to a community which it was claimed could support but one
gas company. Another company entered the field, whereupon the plaintiff cut
its rates. This caused the defendant Public Service Commission to issue an
order setting minimum rates higher than the plaintiff's charges. Plaintiff sought
an injunction to restrain defendant from enforcing the rates set. Held, that the
minimum rates set were unreasonable because of the competition. Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission et al., 52 F. (2d) 802 (D. Mont.
1931).
The due process clauses of the Federal Constitution in spite of their frequent
application 1 inevitably leave much leeway from case to case, especially in connection with public utility rate regulations. 2 The instant case is novel 2 in that the
2Note
(93o) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 762; Note (1926) 14 GEO. L. REV. 409.
1IOI Pa. Super. 168 (i93I), noted in (13i) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 269.

See the articles

by Prof. William H. Lloyd in (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 43, and in (1931)
Ass'N Q. No. io, p. I.
' Contra: Myers v. Brown, 92 N. J. Eq. 348, 112 Atl. 844 (1921).
'REEDER,
2

VALIDITY OF RATE REGuLATION (1914) 118.

PA. BAR

Freund, The Right To a Judicial Review in Rate Controversies (1921) 27 W. VA.
L. Q. 2o7, 2o8.
SIt is well settled that when a commission establishes rates too low they may be set
aside as being confiscatory, but the nearest case to saying that a utility may charge below
a minimum rate was where a commission stated, "There is, in our opinion, nothing in our
laws which prohibits a public utility from giving the public the benefit of a lower rate than
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plaintiff desired to charge lower rates than those set by the commission. The court
held that the plaintiff had the right to do this since it would become insolvent
if the order was complied with. This decision seems to be in conflict with the
reason behind minimum rates,4 i. e., to avoid ruinous rate wars between public
utility companies. The courts 5 are beginning to look with disfavor upon this
method of competition in the public utility field. The tendency has likewise
manifested itself in legislative enactments 1 requiring a public utility company
to show the need for its services as a prerequisite to its right to do business.
Under such legislation the situation in the instant case could not arise. The
difficulty, however, is that though Montana, the situs of the principal case, has
a statute of a like nature in respect to motor bus companies 7 it is without one
in regard to public utilities in general. In this situation it would seem that the
basis of decisions should be the reasonableness of the rates s in the light of economic laws " and the special circumstances of the case.'
Here the competitive
rate sought to be applied was so low as to be unremunerative 11 and was clearly
motivated by a desire to put a competitor out of business. Such a rate is not
reasonable according to the usual tests, i. e., the return on capital to the utility
company, the value of the service to the consumer and the comparative return
on investments in other fields.' 2 It seems also that the decision was contrary
to the policy of regulation in the particular state, the policy being to favor competition under these circumstances. This is inferred from the absence of a statute, common in this country, 3 as pointed out above, requiring a certificate of
necessity. The result of this case conflicts with that policy since the plaintiff,
being the older and more firmly established company, would by means of a rate
war drive out all competition.
TAXATION-CNSTITUTIONALITY OF TAX ON CLUB MEMBERSHIP-The ap-

pellee became a life member of a club in 19o6. The collector of internal revenue
collected a tax under the Revenue Act of 1926, as amended,' which provided
that a life member of a club shall annually pay a tax equivalent to that paid by
annual members. Held, that the tax was not one on property, but a valid excise
tax. MacLaughlin v. Williams, 52 F. (2d) 724 (C.C.A. 3d, 1931).

The historic Hylton case intimated that a direct tax, which according to the
Constitution must be apportioned, 2 included only a capitation tax or a tax on
may be prescribed by the Commission, should it appear to the interest of the corporation in
the exercise of a sound business policy so to do, provided, of course, it does not unlawfully
discriminate in so doing." Re Electric Light & Power Rates Practice etc. (Ga.) P. U. R,
i917 E, 721, 728.
aI SPuRR, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERvIcE REGULATION (1924) 73.
5
West Suburban Transp. Co. v. Chicago & West Towns Ry., 309 Ill. 87, 14o N. E. 56
(I923); Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, 1o3 W. Va. 173, 136 S. E. 833 (927); McKinley
Telephone Co. v. Cumberland Tel. Company, 152 Wis. 359, 14o N. W. 38 (913) ; Hardman,
The Changing Law of Competition in Public Service (1927) 33 W. V.-. L. Q. 219.
'See Note (2924) 24 COL.L. REv. 528; Hall, Certificates of Convenience and Necessity
(1929) 28 MicH. L. REv. io7.
ILAws
OF MONT. i93i, c. 284.
8
REEDEn, op. cit. supra note I, at 226.
'Guernesy, Principles Underlying Reasonable Rates (i927) 2 AIx.. L. J. 3.
Covington etc. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578, 597, 17 Sup. Ct
198, "See
20 (189).
' See p. Sot of opinion in principal case for a statement to this effect by the Public
Service Commission.
'Supra note 9,
' See supra note 6.
'44 STAT. 92 (1926) as amended by 45 STAT. 864 (1928), 26 U. S. C. § 872 (1928).
'Art. I, § 2, Clause 3, reads: "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several states . . . according to their respective numbers."
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land.' This construction was accepted by the Supreme Court during the next
century, 4 but was overthrown by the famous Pollock case, 5 where it was said
that a tax on any property or the issue therefrom was a direct tax. Hence, in
order to hold the tax valid in the instant case, the court had to hold that it was
not a property tax. Life membership in the club created a contract right to use
the privileges of the club and this contract, completely consummated prior to the
passage of the taxing act, is clearly property. 6 It gave the appellee the right, in
conjunction with a majority of other members, to dissolve the club and to share
in the division of its assets. It has a monetary value,7 large amounts being expended to secure such a membership,8 and a member may not be deprived of it
except by due process." The court said, however, that the tax was on the exercise of the privileges of membership in the club and not on membership itself.
Is this distinction sound? Hamilton aptly said: "What in fact is property but a
fiction, without the beneficial use of it?" 10 This court, however, is not) alone
in the employment of the reasoning which they used to find the tax valid. The
Supreme Court has not in any decision subsequent to the Pollock case, held any
tax levied by Congress to be an unapportioned direct tax, but in each case explains that the tax is not one on the property but on a privilege. 1 Such a distinction cannot be drawn logically, yet since the framers of the Constitution
apparently did not intend that such a tax as this should be apportioned, 12 it seems
that a more satisfactory technique would be to revert to the narrower definition
of a direct tax that existed prior to the Pollock case,
Art. I, § 9, Clause 4 reads: "No capitation, or other direct tax, shall be laid, unless in
proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."
'Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (1796) (tax on carriages held a tax on expense
and therefore an excise and not a direct tax). Mr. Justice Chase said: "I am inclined to
think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the
Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitalization or poll tax, . . . and a tax on land.
I doubt whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United
States, is included within the term direct tax." Justice Iredell said: "Perhaps a direct tax,
in the sense of the Constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on something inseparably
annexed to the soil, something capable of apportionment under all such circumstances."
'See Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433 (1868) (tax on the incomes of insurance
companies held an indirect tax) ; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869) (tax on state
bank notes held not a direct tax) ; Springer v. United States, IO2 U. S. 588 (188o) (tax on
income
held not a direct tax).
5
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 6oi, 15 Sup. Ct. 912 (895).
'A contract is property. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685,
17 Sup. Ct. 718 (1897) ; Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 5o2, 43 Sup. Ct.
437 (I922).

It is a contract under which the purchaser is pecuniarily in the same position as if he
had 8purchased from the club or from an insurance company an annuity equalling the dues.
A life membership in the club involved in this case costs $I25o.
'In Rigby v. Connoll, I4 Ch. D. 482 (188o) at 487, the: court said: "I have no doubt
whatever that the foundation of the jurisdiction is the right of property vested in the mem-

bers of the society."

103 HAMILTON'S WORKS (ISIO) 34. In Thompson v. Kreutzer, 112 Miss. I65, 72 So.
89i (1916) (annual privilege tax upon each person pursuing the business of buying, owning,
or holding more than one thousand acres of land held a tax on property and therefore unconstitutional), it was said, "A tax on a thing is a tax on all its essential attributes, and a
tax on an essential of a thing is a tax on the thing itself."
' See Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, i9 Sup. Ct. 522 (1899) (a tax levied upon sales at a
business exchange held valid, as it was not a tax upon the sales but "upon the privilege, opportunity or facility offered at boards of trade or exchanges for the transaction of the business
mentioned in the act") ; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (19oo) (a. succession tax upon legacies or distributive shares of personalty passing at death was valid as a
tax, not upon an inherent right of ownership but upon privilege) ; Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S.
6o8, 22 Sup. Ct. 493 (1902) (a tax upon manufactured tobacco in the hands of a dealer held
an excise and not a direct tax) ; Multnomah Club v. Huntley, 47 F. (2d) 352 (D. Ore. 1930)
(decision same as instant case upon similar set of facts).

"An examination of the records of the Convention fails to disclose just what the

framers of the Constitution did mean by a direct tax. No definite meaning was agreed upon
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TAXATION-UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

OF INHERITANCE TAX ON SHARES OF

CORPORATION-Maine assessed a tax upon transfer by death of shares
of a Maine corporation. These shares were part of the estate of a decedent who,
at the time of his death, was domiciled in Massachusetts. Suit was brought by
Maine for the amount of the assessment less a credit which was given for the
payment to Massachusetts of a death transfer tax on the same shares. Held
(Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis dissenting), that the exaction of this tax
was not within the p6wer of Maine under the Fourteenth Amendment. First
National Bk. of Boston v. State of Maine, 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (U. S. 1932).
Contrary to expectations I the majority of the Supreme Court has taken the
stand that "shares of stock, like the other intangibles, constitutionally, can be
subjected to a death transfer tax by one State only" and that a state cannot imalso
pose such a tax because it is the place of incorporation if the shares are
2
subjected to a tax by the state which is the domicile of the shareholder.
DOMESTIC

WILLS-POWERS-BLEIDING----EECUTION

BY GENERAL BEQUEST IMPROP-

ERLY WITNESsED-Donee of a general testamentary power of appointment appointed, by her will, her sister executrix and after directing certain payments,
gave all the remainder of her property to this sister. This residuary clause was
invalid because improperly witnessed. Held, that donee had exercised the power
in favor of herself so that the property subject to it passed as property of which

she died intestate. In re Vanderbyl [1931] I Ch. Div. 216.
In England since the Wills Act of 1837,1 and in the majority of the American States, 2 it is held, contrary to the common law,8' that a general power of
appointment will be exercised by a general bequest without any reference whatsoever to the power, unless a contrary intention appears on the will itself. Under
this rule the questions arise whether a testator by so exercising the power has
blended property subject to it with his own so that it passes as his own property
in the Convention.

One writer describes the situation thus: "Amid this diversity of opinion

only one thing is sure, namely, that no one knew exactly what was meant by a direct tax,
because no two people agreed." SELIGMAN, THE INcOmE TAX (1914) 569. See MADISON'S
NOTES ON THE FEDERAL CONVENTION' OF
at 350.
CONVENTION OF 1787 (191I)

1787 in

2 FARRAD, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL

It is generally agreed, however, as Justice Patterson said in the Hylton case, that the
purpose of requiring direct taxes to be apportioned was to protect the Southern States,
vhich had many slaves and extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled and not very productive; while the other states had but few slaves and several of them a limited territory,
well settled and highly cultivated. Therefore, it would seem that the framers of the Constitution were dnly interested in having taxes on land or capitation taxes apportioned.

'See (1931) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 134.
2The Court expressly leaves open the question as to which state may tax where) one is
the domicile of a shareholder and the other is one in which the shares have acquired a situs
"analogous to the actual situs of tangible personal property."
17 Wm. IV & I Vicr., c. 26, § 27 (1837) ; Lake v. Currie, 2 DeG. M. & G. 536 (1852);
PoWRs (3d ed. 1916) 265; see (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L. Rav. io7.
FARwELT,
2
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and North Carolina have adopted the rule as part of
their common law. Stone v. Forbes, 189 Mass. 163, 168, 75 N. E. 141, 142 (19o5) ; Emery
v. Haven, 67 N. H. 503, 35 AtI. 940 (1893) ; Johnston v. Knight, 117 N. C. 122, 23 S. E. 92
(1895). The other states adopting this rule have done so by statute. (1927) 76 U. OF PA.
L. REv. io7. Pennsylvania adopted the rule by the Act of 1917, P. L. 403, § II, 20 P. S.

§

223 (1930).

I At common law the donee of a power of appointment, except in the one instance where
he had no property of his own, could not exercise it without explicit reference to the power,
unless there was a clear indication of an intention so to do. KALas, ESTATES FUTURE
INTERESTS (2d ed. 192o) § 641; Lippincott v. Haviland, 93 N. J. Eq. 585, 117 Atl. 147 (1922).
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and not as that of the donor of the power,4 and furthermore, if there is such
blending, whether the donee meant to take the property out of the instrument
creating the power for all purposes, or only for the limited purpose of giving5
effect to the particular disposition expressed. These are questions of intention.
Where the donee's appointment by will is rendered ineffective because the
appointee predeceases him, the rule has been evolved that the mere appointment
of itself will not raise an inference of an intention to make the property the
donee's own for all purposes," but there may be other indidia showing that intent,
such as treating the appointed fund and the donee's own property as one mass,7
and charging the entirety with debts and expenses and appointing executors.
It would seem that in any case where the will had failed to operate, the rule is
equally applicable because the instrument is not being used as a will but only as
an aid to the court in determining the testator's intention. But, it is submitted,
the rule itself is without merit, for by it the property subject to the power passes
neither in default of appointment as the donor of the power intended, nor by the
will of the donee as he intended, but rather as property of which the donee died
intestate, a result probably never contemplated by him.
WILLS-TRUSTS-RIGHT OF LIFE TENANT TO PROFITS FROm PARTNERAFTER DEATH OF TESTATOR-A created a testamentary trust
of the residue of his estate, the income to be paid to B for life. The partnership
firm, of which A had been a member, was continued by the surviving partner
for six months after A's death, pursuant to the partnership agreement. Of the
fund remitted to A's executors, at the termination of this period, $90,000 represented profits and interest on A's capital investment, from the time of A's
death. The question arose whether this sum was corpus or income. Held, that
SHIP CONTINUED

this sum was corpus.

In re Prince's Will, 252 N. Y. Supp. 908 (1931).

The life tenant of a testamentary trust is, in the absence of a contrary intention,' entitled to income from the date of the testator's death, even where the
exact limits of a residuary trust estate are subsequently to be determined.2 This
is based on the presumption that the testator intended to prefer an immediate

'McCord's

Estate, 276 Pa. 459, 12o Atl. 413 (1923).

'Farwell, op. cit. supra note I, 268. Thus the language of a general bequest has been
held to indicate an intention not to exercise the power at all, In re Davies' Trusts, 13 Eq.
163 (1871) ; or an intention to exercise it only for the purposes of descent by will of the
property subject to it, Kates's Estate, 282 Pa. 417, 128 Atl. 97 (1925) ; or to exercise it for
the purpose of making the property available to his creditors, Whitlock-Rose-v. McCaughn,
21 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) ; or for allowing inheritance tax to be levied against it
as his own property, McCord's Estate, supra note 4; Forney's Estate, 28o Pa. 282, 124 Atl.
424 (1924); and finally in the case of a lapsed gift by will, for all purposes so that it
passed as property of which he died intestate, In re Ickeringill's Estate, 17 Ch. ). 151
(1881); Willoughby-Osbourne v. Holyoake, 22 Ch. D. 238 (1883); It re Marten, I Ch.
314 (19o2) ; cf. Wilkins v. Charreton, 22 W. R. 598 (1874), in which it was held that a
will, invalid because witnessed by an interested party, was a sufficient exercise of a general
power of appointment to pass the property subject to the power in the manner directed by
the will.
6
In re Davies' Trusts, supra note 5.
71In re Ickeringill's Estate; Willoughby-Osbourne v. Holyoake, both supra note 5.
'The clear intention of the creator of the trust, as expressed in the will, always control, the rule established in any jurisdiction being merely one of probable intention.,
Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Von Holt, 216 U. S. 367, 30 Sup. Ct. 303 (I9io);, Old Colony.
Co. v. Forsyth, 271 Mass. 511, 17i N. E. 734 (193o) and Note (1930) 7o A. L. R. 636.
Trust
2
Commercial Trust Co. v. Gould, io5 N. J. Eq. 727, 149 Atl. 590 (193o); In re Lord,,

134 Misc. 198, 236 N. Y. Supp. 136 (1929).
1929).

Contra: White v. Chaplin, 148 Atl. 21 (N. H.
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beneficiary, the life tenant, over a later one, the remainderman. s Where the testator has directed that the property is to be sold at some future time,4 although
this might indicate an intention that the life tenant is to get no income until after
the final sale, most courts, nevertheless, say that the life tenant has the right to
income from the time of the testator's death. 5 The income awarded him is not
the actual profits earned by the property 8 but it is a reasonable amount of interest
on a sum which if properly invested would have equalled the value of the testator's property at the time his direction is carried out. 7 In the principal case
the court refused to apportion the sum received from the liquidation of the partnership 8 on the ground that, since it represented but a small portion of the entire
residuary estate, an intent not to apportion is shown. It is submitted that although this factor may affect what the court thinks the life beneficiary should
enjoy, it in no way indicates an intention on the part of the testator contrary to
that usually presumed by the courts to exist. The reasoning of the court is also
unsatisfactory from a practical standpoint, because it has unnecessarily opened a
new field of litigation to determine when the proportion of the estate is large
enough to affect the court's opinion. sufficiently to cause an apportionment.
'Mulcahy v. Johnson, 8o Colo. 499, 252 Pac. 816 (1927); Leitch's Will, 185 Wis. 257,
N. W. 284 (i94). The usual language of the courts is well illustrated by a portion
of the opinion of the Wisconsin court above, "The reason for this rule is frequently declared
to be that the life tenant ranks first in the consideration of the testator, and a contrary construction would take from the life tenant a portion of the income, add it to the corpus and
thus, at the expense of the life tenant, swell the estate of the remainderman, who, presumably stands second to the life tenant in the consideration of the testator."
'The problem is the same where the trust property must be sold because it is not in
the proper form for a trust investment. The same result is reached allowing income from
the date of the testator's death. It re Hopkins, 133 Misc. 554, 233 N. Y. Supp. 326 (1929)
(reversed on another ground in 226 App. Div. 18o, 234 N. Y. Supp. 700 (1929)) ; Greene
v. Greene, 19 R. I. 61g, 35 Atl. iO4z (1896).
"Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 412 (1884); Equitable Trust Co. v. Kent, ii Del. Ch. 334,
ioi Atl. 875 (1917). Where the property in question is unproductive realty, the problem
has many ramifications which are examined in Brandis, Trust Administration: Apportionnent of Proceeds of Sale of Unproductive Land and of Expenses (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV.
127; Note (930)
40 YALE L. J. 275.
'Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 681, 67 N. E. 658 (19o3); Lawrence v. Littlefield,
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215 N. Y. 561, lO9 N. E. 611 (1915).

Contra: Green v. Green, 3o N. J. Eq. 451 (1879)

(actual income from testator's death allowed to life beneficiary) ; White v. Chaplin, supra

note 2 (actual income allowed for a period starting one year after testator's death by
analogy to statutes relating to legacies).
'This is treating the property as equitably converted as of the time of the testator's
death. Thus, in the principal case, if the testator's share in the partnership was $i,oooooo,
profits and interest $9o,ooo, equitable interest 517 and date of actual conversion of the property one year after testator's death, the total proceeds $I,o9Oooo are divided by I.o5 which
gives an equitable corpus of $I,O38,o95.24 and an equitable income of $51,904.76.
'This is of course contrary to the general trend of decisions which allows income where
the property converted is an interest in a partnership. Heighe v. Littig, 63 Md. 301 (1885) ;
Westcott v. Nickerson, io Mass. 410 (1876); 2 PtRRY, TRusTs AND TRusTEEs (7th ed.
1929) § 547.
'The court seems to presume an intent that the life tenant shall not receive income
from the testator's death, contrary to the general rule. The court says at 911: "Matter of
McCollum, (8o App. Div. 362, 8o N. Y. Supp. 755) ['9o3] was decided upon the intention
disclosed by the testator that the life tenant was to convey the profits of the partnership as
income because there was no other fund out of which the life tenant was entitled to any
share. In the instant case, there is no such intention disclosed, and the life beneficiary of
the trust is entitled to the annual income upon a very large estate other than the interest
flowing from the partnership". It is submitted that the court's interpretation of the McCollum case is incorrect. That case merely followed the majority view, deciding that the right
to income accrued from the testator's death and did not do so because that was the only
fund to which the beneficiary was entitled.

